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INTRODUCTION: AN ODYSSEY AND AN AWAKENING 
In 1985 I was convicted for a robbery related homicide. I wish I could 
say that it wasn’t me, that they picked the wrong person out of the line-
up, or that I had nothing to do with the actual shooting, but I can’t. The 
minute I picked up a gun with the thought that a robbery would somehow 
rid me of my drug dependent lifestyle was the minute I became the coward 
who would end up taking someone’s life. I received an eighteen years to 
life sentence and before I knew it, I was in Attica Correctional Facility. I 
was a twenty-three-year-old unskilled high school graduate who had 
never been incarcerated. I didn’t know how I would make it to see the 
next day, let alone the next eighteen years. All I had was the present, “one 
day at a time.” 
Prison is a world in and of itself. It is designed to break the human 
spirit. Yet, strangely, there was a familiarity about prison that I didn’t ex-
pect. Sure, the constant threat of cell bars, prison guards, and gun towers 
were all new and intimidating, but the sense that there was no way out 
and the constant threat of violence were, in many respects, no different 
than where I grew up in the Bronx. Many of us came from the same neigh-
borhoods, same families, and formed the same gangs. Drugs were readily 
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available, as was gambling, and prostitution. It would be years before I 
would hear the term “school-to-prison pipeline,” but once I did, I knew 
for certain that it was more than just a catch phrase—we were its by-prod-
uct. 
While in prison, I was determined not to repeat the same behavior 
that led me there. The first chance I had, I enrolled in college. Back then, 
each joint had a college program: Attica had Genesee Community Col-
lege, Auburn had Syracuse University, Sing Sing had New York Theo-
logical Seminary, and years later Eastern had the Bard Prison Initiative. 
At Attica Correctional Facility, I worked in the metal shop during the day, 
went to class at night, and on the weekends, after working out, I would 
learn about Islam and politics in the yard with Muslims and Black Liber-
ation Army political prisoners. 
By the time I was able to count years instead of months spent in max-
imum security prisons, I had been moved around from Attica to Auburn 
to Eastern to Sing Sing, and back to Eastern again. The moving around 
process was a way to incentivize good behavior. I started out in one of the 
most dangerous prisons in the nation and moved to facilities that provided 
more program options so long as I was not a security threat. However, 
unlike other states whose parole systems provide good behavior incen-
tives to earn early parole considerations, in the state of New York, my 
eighteen years to life sentence meant that I must serve every day of eight-
een years before I could be considered eligible for parole. As I neared the 
eighteen-year mark, I began to look at my achievements in preparation of 
my first parole board hearing. I had acquired an associate’s degree, a 
bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree, and eight years of American Sign 
Language experience working with the Deaf and hearing impaired at 
Eastern New York Correctional Facility. I had also facilitated the Alter-
native to Violence Project, received several Department of Corrections 
and Community Supervision Commendable Behavior Reports, and was 
fortunate to have a couple of poems published.1 
I made my first parole appearance in August 2003, at Eastern New 
York Correctional Facility. I was forty-one years old. I had no idea what 
to expect. I was anxious and nervous but also confident in the changes I 
had made in my life. I knew I had to address the issues that put me in the 
frame of mind where I lost compassion for another human being. I be-
lieved the changes I made reflected a commitment to atone. On the day I 
actually appeared at the Board of Parole (“the Board”), I sat before two 
commissioners and the hearing lasted over thirty minutes. I later learned 
that a hearing which lasted for thirty minutes was practically unheard of. 
 
 1 For some of the author’s published poems, see Alejo Dao’ud Rodriguez, in DOING 
TIME: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PRISON WRITING 222, 222-23 (Bell Gale Chevigny ed., 1999). 
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I had asked around from people who I knew had been before the parole 
board and overwhelmingly their experiences were that parole hearings 
lasted fewer than ten minutes.2 
A day after the hearing, I received my decision. Parole denied. The 
explanation for the denial amounted to the “nature of the crime.” In other 
words, I was denied for the same reason I was convicted. No matter what 
I did with my time in prison, the programs I participated in, my rehabili-
tative transformation, remorse and insight, it was all glossed over. The 
essential questions of my present state of mind, or whether I was suitable 
for release didn’t seem to matter. I was denied and rescheduled to appear 
twenty-four months later. 
I sought to appeal the Board’s decision. With no money for an attor-
ney I became a regular at the prison law library. I had no knowledge of 
the parole appeal process and getting an entry level understanding con-
sumed practically all of twenty-four months. My appeal went nowhere 
and all I could do was start preparing for my next appearance. That 2005 
parole board appearance resulted in another “nature of the crime” denial. 
I was again denied parole in 2007, but by then I had become familiar with 
navigating my way through the parole appeal process and in 2008 I re-
ceived notice that the Board decided to grant me a new hearing based on 
the merits of my appeal. In that appeal, I argued that the Board’s decision 
to deny parole relied solely on the nature of the crime, and that three con-
secutive denials based on the same factor that was considered at sentenc-
ing was evidence that the Board’s decision was a foregone conclusion. 
The fact that the Board’s Administrative Appeals Unit decided to grant 
me a new hearing gave me a revived sense of hope. It was a hope that was 
short lived. In the summer of 2008, I was again denied parole for the same 
reason. It would be a process that would repeat itself in 2009, 2011, 2013, 
and 2015. Each denial determination was a new arbitrary version of the 
previous one. 
However, in February 2016 an Orange County Supreme Court Judge 
ruled in favor of my 2015 appeal on the arbitrary nature of the Board’s 
decision to deny me parole and ordered a new hearing. I reappeared before 
the Board on April 22, 2016, and to my surprise, I was again denied pa-
role. I could not count the times I would second-guess myself as a result 
of those parole hearings and their outcomes. I could not count the times 
that I wondered if I had just said this instead of that then maybe that would 
have made a difference. Or the times when I would hear that someone 
else had received a “release to parole” decision and I would find myself 
 
 2 See Michael Winerip et al., For Blacks Facing Parole in New York State, Signs of a 
Broken System, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/CQ2Q-P372, for reporting on the 
insufficient length of parole hearings. 
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fighting against feelings of resentment. There was a part of me that 
wanted to be genuinely happy for others, but the Board’s decisions 
seemed so random that it became difficult to even look at the release of 
someone else as a silver-lining of hope. I hated seeing this trait in myself 
and I hated it more when I saw traces of it mirrored in others around me—
a sort of detached indifference—in the halls and mess halls, gyms and law 
libraries, in prison yards, and facility clinics where mental stress shows 
up in physical infirmities. 
The haunting reality of the effects of ongoing parole denials brought 
me to a crossroad: either I succumb to the promise of despair or I look for 
a way out. I chose the latter. Besides taking on my own legal parole appeal 
battles, I took the law library’s legal research course which allowed me to 
work in the law library with others who were appealing their parole deci-
sions. I also began to involve myself more in restorative-justice-type ac-
tivities and community-building programs,3 and tried to keep pace with 
mounting studies on incarceration that began to gain wider social atten-
tion within the last twenty or so years. As my time continued to extend 
beyond twenty, twenty-five, and into thirty years, I began to uncover in-
sights into the nature of parole in relation to what I was entitled. Namely, 
that there is no constitutional right to be paroled4 and that according to 
the laws of the State of New York, the Board of Parole has significant 
discretionary authority in making parole release decisions.5 It is a power 
that not even the courts can interrupt.6 
WHAT I SAW / MY PRELIMINARY RESEARCH 
The stress alone of having to endure what I began to see as arbitrary 
parole denials prompted me to try to make heads or tails of the process. I 
 
 3 Some of the activities that I participated in were the Alternative to Violence Project 
where I was the Coordinator from 2007-2011 at Arthur Kill Correctional Facility. I also par-
ticipated in the Network Support Services as the Resident Coordinator from 2012-2015 at the 
Otisville Correctional Facility. From 2012 to 2016, I was the Co-Facilitator of the Otisville 
Correctional Facility’s Lifers and Long-Termers Organization’s Reconciliation Workshop. 
 4 Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (“There is 
no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before 
the expiration of a valid sentence.”). 
 5 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(5) (McKinney 2019) (“Any action by the board or by a hear-
ing officer pursuant to this article shall be deemed a judicial function and shall not be review-
able if done in accordance with law.”). 
 6 See Russo v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 75 (1980) (“[W]here a court fails 
to impose an [Minimum Period of Imprisonment (MPI)], the Parole Board shall do so in ac-
cordance with its promulgated guidelines, or shall issue a written explanation of its reasons 
for departing from the guidelines. The law contains no restriction limiting the Parole Board to 
an MPI which a court could have imposed or requiring that the board establish an MPI of less 
than the full sentence.”). 
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dove into law books and legal commentaries to understand the world of 
parole as it existed in New York. Through my initial legal research I 
learned that between 1980 and 2011, the Board of Parole had been oper-
ating under the authority of a statute that was fundamentally altered.7 My 
next lesson came by way of a rush of published texts on mass incarcera-
tion.8 Most of these works, however, focused their criticisms on the War 
on Drugs and fell short on any in-depth analysis of the plight of people 
serving parole-eligible life sentences for violent crimes. Still, these texts 
proved to be invaluable sources of information with accessible reference 
points and innovative descriptions of the social policies, laws, prosecution 
and prisons used as a means of social control of disadvantaged communi-
ties, which resulted in the advent of mass incarceration. 
In recent years, significant reporting on parole has been published.9 
In July 2015, The Marshall Project published a report which highlighted 
the absolute authority that parole boards wield: 
[Parole] statutes are often vaguely worded, with language that is 
easily sidestepped . . . And unlike politicians, who are bound by 
open records and disclosure laws and are accountable to their con-
stituents, parole boards often operate behind closed doors. Their 
decisions are largely unreviewable by the courts – or anyone 
else.10 
In December 2016, the New York Times reported on the existence of 
racial discrimination in parole release decisions.11 The article revealed 
that a study of “thousands of parole decisions from the past several years 
found that fewer than one in six [B]lack or Hispanic men was released at 
 
 7 EXEC. § 259-i(1), repealed by Budgets--Financial Services, ch. 62, § 38-f, 2011 N.Y. 
Laws 611; see also Phillip M. Genty, Changes to Parole Laws Signal Potentially Sweeping 
Policy Shift, N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 1, 2011) (“The 2011 amendments . . . repealed the troublesome 
subdivision 1 of Section 259-i of the Executive Law, the section that had set out procedures 
for conducting the obsolete function of setting minimum periods of imprisonment. This was 
long overdue, given that the Parole Board has not had this responsibility since 1980.”). 
 8 These texts include, but are not limited to: MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: 
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE 
PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003); ERNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF 
MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2011); CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE 
AND PRISONS IN THE AGE OF CRISIS (1999). 
 9 See, e.g., Michelle Lewin & Nora Carroll, Collaborating Across the Walls: A Commu-
nity Approach to Parole Justice, 20 CUNY L. REV. 249 (2017); PAROLE PREPARATION 
PROJECT & THE RELEASE AGING PEOPLE IN PRISON CAMPAIGN, NEW YORK STATE PAROLE 
BOARD: FAILURES IN STAFFING AND PERFORMANCE (2018), https://perma.cc/VVV4-98DD; 
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, ANNUAL REPORT 2017 (2017), https://perma.cc/SW9B-BBEH. 
 10 Beth Schwartzapfel, Life Without Parole, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (July 10, 2015, 2:15 
PM), https://perma.cc/2GZK-7V88. 
 11 Winerip et al., supra note 2. 
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his first hearing, compared with one in four white men.”12 The disparity 
was found among people serving parole eligible sentences for small-time 
property crimes.13 However, among parole eligible individuals convicted 
of a violent offense, the study found that “the board rarely released violent 
offenders of any race, denying nearly ninety percent of them at their initial 
interview.”14 
New York State does not have different parole laws for different cat-
egories of offenses. However, with a ninety percent rate of denial, there 
is a different, unwritten standard for people who committed what would 
be considered a violent crime. Unfortunately, while the New York Times 
article highlighted systemic racial discrimination in parole decisions gen-
erally, it failed to address the Parole Board’s blatant discriminatory prac-
tices against people accused of violent felonies. 
A call to action to address the existence of one form of discrimina-
tion, in this case racial discrimination, should never disqualify or mini-
mize the existence of other forms of discrimination. Even more troubling 
is that in the aftermath of the New York Times article nothing changed; 
there were no official statements of accountability, no class action law-
suits against the Board’s discriminatory practices. Without a guaranteed 
constitutional right to parole, these systemic abuses against a disadvan-
taged class of people will continue to resurface. I argue that in this current 
time of our criminal justice history, the issue of granting constitutional 
rights to people eligible for parole must be included in the discussion on 
criminal justice reform.  
ROADMAP 
In Section I, I demonstrate how the backdrop of societal policies has 
fueled the current era of mass incarceration. In Section II, I explain how 
the U.S. Supreme Court case Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal 
and Correctional Complex determined that people who are incarcerated 
do not have a constitutional right to parole. In Section III, I argue why 
this case was not intended to be precedent forty years later: Chief Justice 
Burger noted in the majority opinion that the subject of parole was still 
experimental because they did not know all the factors surrounding parole 
at the time of the decision. We now know some of those factors that are 
 
 12 Id. 
 13 See id. (“It is a disparity that is particularly striking not for the most violent [offenders], 
like rapists and murderers, but for small-time offenders who commit property crimes like 
stealing a television from a house or shoplifting from Duane Reade—precisely the people 
many states are now working to keep out of prison in the first place.”). 
 14 Id. 
40 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:2 
relevant in New York State including that (i) the New York Board of Ap-
peals abused their discretion in setting the Minimum Period of Incarcera-
tion; (ii) the New York State Board of Parole’s disproportionate denial 
rates of parole against people convicted of violent offenses have less to 
do with public safety and more to do with the federal financial incentives 
offered to states to hold people convicted of violent offense in prison 
longer; and (iii) that the Board of Parole did not write or implement le-
gally mandated changes for over five years. Consequently, the Board of 
Parole’s abusive practices have disadvantaged a class of people who 
would otherwise be eligible for release to parole, and without any guar-
anteed constitutional rights to parole release, there will be ongoing gov-
ernmental abuse of people in prison. 
I. CONTEXTUALIZING THE ROLE OF MASS INCARCERATION IN SOCIETY 
The United States imprisons more people than any other country in 
the world,15 yet the sum total of mass incarceration cannot be defined 
solely by the amount of people in prison. In order to get a full picture of 
the role of mass incarceration in the United States, one must contextualize 
the socio-political framework that created the system. Ernest Drucker, au-
thor of A Plague of Prisons, defined mass incarceration as a network of 
policies and institutions that support large scale use of prisons for political 
or social purposes in which to sustain social control over a class of people, 
and which has little to do with law enforcement.16 It is undeniable that 
when we look at the boom of people in prison over the last forty years, 
the enforcement of laws has disproportionately imprisoned those who are 
identifiably African Americans and Latinos by race, and the working poor 
by class.17 
While this may seem out-of-sync with the daily bombardment of 
crimes in the media, the media has actually caused and perpetuated racial 
biases among the public, including law enforcement, leading to a discrim-
inatory administration of criminal justice.18 As Michelle Alexander has 
put it, “once a public consensus was constructed by political and media 
 
 15 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Yes, U.S. Locks People Up at a Higher Rate than Any Other 
Country, WASH. POST (July 7, 2015), https://perma.cc/2GYD-3LM6; AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, 
INCARCERATION NATION (2014), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/10/incarceration [https://
perma.cc/4QBC-4WKW]. 
 16 DRUCKER, supra note 8, at 40-41. 
 17 Id. at 44-45 (pointing out that that inner-city communities of color have become virtual 
prison “feeder communities” which has resulted in a depletion of human capital); see also 
DAVIS, supra note 8, at 113 (“[People of color and the poor] are sent to prison, not so much 
because of the crimes they may have indeed committed, but largely because their communities 
have been criminalized.”). 
 18 See ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 104-05. 
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elites that drug crime is black and brown . . . . an extraordinarily high risk 
of racial bias in the administration of criminal justice was present, given 
the way in which all crime had been framed in the media and in political 
discourse.” 19 Alexander recognizes “[t]he stark and sobering reality is 
that, for reasons largely unrelated to actual crime trends, the American 
penal system has emerged as a system of social control unparalleled in 
world history.”20 This obscure yet underlying characteristic of mass in-
carceration points directly to an economic-stimulus initiative, better 
known as the prison-industrial complex, intended to rescue numerous 
economically depressed rural white working-class counties.21 
Alex Lichtenstein also emphasized the use of prisons as an eco-
nomic-stimulus initiative: 
When Ta-Nehisi Coates says that America’s bloated and enor-
mously expensive dependence on imprisonment has created a 
“social service program . . . for a whole class of people,” he hits 
the nail on the head. Perhaps correctional expenditures—police, 
courts, jails, prisons, halfway houses, parole offices, and all the 
rest—are better classified as “welfare” expenditures. Mass incar-
ceration is not just (or even mainly) a response to crime, but rather 
a perverse form of social spending that uses state power to address 
a host of social problems at the back end, from poverty to drug 
addiction to misbehavior in school. These are problems that vot-
ers, taxpayers, and politicians—especially white voters, taxpay-
ers, and politicians—seem unwilling to address in any other way. 
And even as this spending exacts a toll on those it targets, it con-
fers economic benefits on others, creating employment in white 
rural areas, an enormous government-sponsored market in prison 
supplies, and cheap labor for businesses.22 
This “enormous government-sponsored market” emerged as the 
United States has proclaimed itself the champion of freedom and democ-
racy, all the while holding the undisputed world title in the imprisonment 
 
 19 Id. at 107-08 (discussing the disproportionate featuring of African Americans in news 
stories associated to drug crime, the racially charged “political rhetoric and media imagery 
associated with the drug war” in news stories, and the “media bonanza inspired by the 
[Reagan] administration’s campaign [that] solidified in the public imagination the image of 
the black drug criminal.”). For more on the War on Drugs, and its impact on the media and on 
the public’s conflation of crime and race, see id. at 104-09. 
 20 Id. at 8. 
 21 DAVIS, supra note 8, at 14-15; PARENTI, supra note 8, at 216-17. 
 22 Alex Lichtenstein, Mass Incarceration Has Become the New Welfare, THE ATLANTIC 
(Sept. 16, 2015), https://perma.cc/DH82-2KRJ. 
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of its citizens.23 This contradiction has so pitted the U.S. against indefen-
sible accusations of hypocrisy, that members of Congress on both sides 
of the aisle have begun to acknowledge that the boom in prison popula-
tions came as a result of failed social policies.24 However, despite bipar-
tisan disclosures and calls to withdraw front-end mandatory sentencing 
guidelines that greatly contributed to the boom in the prison population, 
little attention has been paid to back-end parole denials which have 
equally helped to regulate prison population numbers during a time of 
decreasing crime rates.25 Kate Hatheway writes: 
In the United States, where one of every nine people in prison is 
serving a life sentence, and people of color and children constitute 
nearly two-thirds and 6.5% of all lifers, respectively, changes to 
parole are necessary not only to curb mass incarceration, but also 
to help restore some semblance of equity and humanity to the 
criminal justice system.26 
In New York State, the Board of Parole has complete discretionary 
authority in making parole release determinations.27 The law that governs 
parole requires the Board to make the determination of whether someone 
poses a risk to public safety.28 If a person is denied parole, the Board is 
required to explain its reasons for the denial in detail and in unambiguous 
terms.29 These elements, which are fundamental to the statutory criteria, 
are the same for all parole applicants regardless of the category of their 
 
 23 Id.; see also Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 23, 2008), https://perma.cc/3CMX-CRN3. 
 24 See Eduardo Porter, In the U.S., Punishment Comes Before the Crimes, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 29, 2014), https://perma.cc/4HNG-AWWM. 
 25 Kathy Boudin, Hope, Illusion and Imagination: The Politics of Parole and Reentry in 
the Era of Mass Incarceration, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 563, 565 (2014). 
 26 Kate Hatheway, Creating a Meaningful Opportunity for Review: Challenging the Po-
liticization of Parole for Life-Sentenced Prisoners, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 601, 604 (2017) 
(citing ASHLEY NELLIS, SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON: THE HISTORIC RISE IN LIFE 
SENTENCES IN AMERICA (2013)). 
 27 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(a)(i) (McKinney 2019) (“[A] member or members as de-
termined by the rules of the board shall personally interview such [person who is incarcerated] 
and determine whether he should be paroled . . . .”). 
 28 Id. at § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as 
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after consid-
ering if there is a reasonable probability that . . . his release is not incompatible with the wel-
fare of society . . . .”). 
 29 Id. at § 259-i(2)(a) (“If parole is not granted upon such review, the [person who is in-
carcerated] shall be informed in writing within two weeks of such appearance of the factors 
and reasons for such denial of parole.”). 
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offense.30 So, why are people who committed violent offenses denied pa-
role at a significantly higher percentage than people who committed non-
violent offenses? 
Parole boards often rely on the serious nature of the offense when 
denying parole to someone who committed a violent felony offense, as 
they did in my case. And yet the nature of the crime was already consid-
ered by the sentencing court. The Board duplicates the same consideration 
of the same factor, which bears no insight into a parole applicant’s present 
level of rehabilitation and maturity. This circular approach to the parole 
hearing process has generated great criticism from many proponents of 
parole reform.31 Dr. Kathy Boudin, Director of the Center for Justice at 
Columbia University School of Social Work, observed that “parole deni-
als do not appear to correlate with the issue of public safety. Parole denials 
are part of a much larger system of mass incarceration that has evolved 
over the past decades.”32 Kate Hatheway also pointed out: 
Even as crime rates have experienced periods of decline, the fact 
that lifers are not being released has created a backlog in our pris-
ons of people who no longer pose a threat to society. Between 
1991 and 1997 alone, the average time served on a life sentence 
increased by almost eight years, from 21.2 to twenty-nine years.33 
The findings of ongoing abuse against people serving parole eligible 
life sentences prefaces and supports the claim for constitutionally pro-
tected rights to parole release. However, before entertaining a claim for 
constitutional protection that has been previously denied, it would be ad-
vantageous to learn the reasons why. 
II. EXAMINATION OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN GREENHOLTZ 
In 1979, the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of 
whether individuals in prison had a guaranteed right to be released on 
parole in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional 
 
 30 While N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(a) does not explicitly state that the parole guidelines 
are applied in the same way regardless of the individual’s conviction, the provision does not 
provide a delineation based on category of conviction and instead refers to “an inmate” or “the 
inmate” broadly. Id. 
 31 Beth Schwartzapfel, How Parole Boards Keep Prisoners in the Dark and Behind Bars, 
WASH. POST (July 11, 2015), https://perma.cc/S36D-N6HM; Jarrett Murphy, Advocates Press 
Albany to Fix New York’s Parole System, CITY LIMITS (Jan. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/QD27-
DSLE; Victoria Law, New York’s Parole System Is ‘Broken,’ But Cuomo Can Help Fix It, 
THE VILLAGE VOICE (June 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/V38P-5NYL. 
 32 Boudin, supra note 25, at 565. 
 33 Hatheway, supra note 26, at 603 (footnotes omitted). 
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Complex.34 The Supreme Court determined that states were under no ob-
ligation to incorporate parole as an incentive for early release into their 
sentencing guidelines.35 Thus, there was no constitutionally protected 
guarantee that a person should have the right to be released on parole.36 
The Court ruled that once a state adopts a parole system, individuals shall 
be entitled to the rights of equal protection and due process in accordance 
with the adopted system.37 
The significance of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Greenholtz stems 
from a mounting dispute left in the wake of the Court’s 1972 ruling in 
Morrissey v. Brewer. The issue in Morrissey was whether a person living 
in society under parole supervision has constitutional protections against 
having his or her parole revoked.38 In Morrissey, the Supreme Court de-
termined that people released from prison and living in society, i.e. work-
ing and paying taxes while serving the completion of their sentences on 
parole, were entitled to constitutional protections against having their pa-
role revoked.39 However, in 1979 the Court distinguished its decision in 
Greenholtz from Morrissey, because Greenholtz applied to people who 
were incarcerated and who had not yet been paroled.40 
The Greenholtz Court’s departure from Morrissey revolved around 
whether people in prison deserved the same guaranteed protections that 
were afforded to people facing parole violations and reimprisonment, or 
whether parole release determinations were no more than a privilege to 
be offered at the discretion of parole boards.41 However, in Greenholtz 
the Court noted that “[t]he inmates here . . . are confined and thus subject 
to all the necessary restraints that inhere in a prison.”42 For the purposes 
of due process requirements, the Court held that parolees in society and 
people in prison hoping to make parole are not the same.43 Consequently, 
 
 34 Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). People who 
were incarcerated and eligible for parole brought a class action suit against the Nebraska Penal 
and Correctional Complex, arguing that the parole statute and the Board of Parole had denied 
them of procedural due process. 
 35 Id. at 7 (“A state may . . . establish a parole system, but it has no duty to do so.”). 
 36 Id. (“There is no constitutional or inherent right of a [person who is incarcerated] to be 
conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.”). 
 37 Id. at 16 (“The Nebraska procedure affords an opportunity to be heard, and when parole 
is denied it informs the inmate in what respects he falls short of qualifying for parole; this 
affords the process that is due under these circumstances. The Constitution does not require 
more.”). 
 38 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 472 (1972). 
 39 Id. at 482-84. 
 40 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 9. 
 41 Id. at 9-10. 
 42 Id. at 9. 
 43 Id. at 9-10. “There is a crucial distinction between being deprived of a liberty one has, 
as in parole, and being denied a conditional liberty that one desires.” Id. at 9. 
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the Court concluded that people who were incarcerated had “no constitu-
tional or inherent right” to be paroled from prison.44 
The Court’s dissection of these intricate details in Greenholtz would 
ultimately result in a decision of precedence which has been upheld for 
the last forty years. However, as much as the nation would come to rely 
on Greenholtz regarding questions of constitutionality in parole release 
determinations, what is often overlooked is the fact that the Greenholtz 
ruling did not come to be without significant controversy. For one thing, 
Greenholtz was a highly contested matter with a ruling that was narrowly 
determined by a tiebreaking five-to-four vote.45 
Among the dissenting Supreme Court Justices, Justice Powell found 
that “[l]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the 
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary 
governmental action.”46 Justice Powell further stated that “[f]rom the day 
that he is sentenced in a State with a parole system, a prisoner justifiably 
expects release on parole when he meets the standards of eligibility appli-
cable within that system.”47 Justice Powell reasoned that where there is a 
justifiable expectation of parole, that expectation is deserving of consti-
tutional protections.48 
Justice Thurgood Marshall also wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by 
Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens. Justice Marshall wrote: 
I must register my opinion that all prisoners potentially eligible 
for parole have a liberty interest of which they may not be de-
prived without due process, regardless of the particular statutory 
language that implements the parole system . . . . [W]hen a State 
enacts a parole system, and creates the possibility of release from 
incarceration upon satisfaction of certain conditions, it neces-
sarily qualifies that initial deprivation. In my judgment, it is the 
existence of this system which allows prison inmates to retain 
their protected interest in securing freedoms available outside 
prison. Because parole release proceedings clearly implicate this 
retained liberty interest, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that 
due process be observed, irrespective of the specific provisions in 
the applicable parole statute.49  
 
 44 Id. at 7. 
 45 Id. at 18-40 (Justice Powell concurred in part and dissented in part, and Justice Marshall 
dissented in part with Justices Brennan and Stevens joining). 
 46 Id. at 18 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 47 Id. at 20. 
 48 Id. at 19. 
 49 Id. at 22-23 (footnote omitted). 
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These purposely articulated opinions influenced the majority to 
acknowledge the lack of evidenced-based data necessary to support its 
final determination. As the majority conceded, “the very institution of pa-
role is still in an experimental stage” in which “few certainties exist.”50 
Ultimately, this acknowledgment did not lead the majority to grant the 
claim for constitutionally protected entitlement to parole release. How-
ever, in an unusual acknowledgment, the majority’s opinion emphasized 
for a second time that “the whole question has been and will continue to 
be the subject of experimentation.”51 The majority’s continued use of the 
word “experiment” suggests that the Justices were not wholly convinced 
of the Court’s final determination. 
III. THE GREENHOLTZ RULING WAS NEVER INTENDED TO BE A 
HEADSTONE 
As interpreters of the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court renders 
opinions which are intentionally and purposefully worded.52 Here, the 
Court expressly stated that “the very institution of parole is still in an ex-
perimental stage”53 and that parole-release decisions “will continue to be 
the subject of experimentation.”54 This emphasis cannot be overlooked 
for two reasons. First, there is the doctrine of stare decisis to which the 
Supreme Court is bound to adhere, and “the Constitution was intended—
its very purpose was—to prevent experimentation with the fundamental 
rights of the individual.”55 
Second, even if we were to consider the Court’s description of parole 
as a subject of experimentation and therefore not burdened by the doctrine 
of stare decisis, the inherent requirement of the experimentation pro-
cess—which involves a study of a controlled group, the monitoring of the 
impact in changes of circumstances and a marked timeframe to assess re-
sults—is a methodology which further emphasizes that the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Greenholtz was never intended to be a headstone. 
 
 50 Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
 51 Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 
 52 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty 
of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, 
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”). 
 53 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 8. 
 54 Id. at 13. 
 55 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 338 (1921). The doctrine of stare decisis requires the 
Court to adhere to an established ruling on a matter or provide an explanation of its reasons 
for departure therefrom. In Greenholtz, the bench not only deviated from precedent to affirm 
a policy experiment over fundamental rights, but it also failed to explain its reason for this 
departure. 
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It has now been forty years since the Greenholtz ruling; an era of 
failed social policies which marked the advent of mass incarceration that 
directly and indirectly influenced an increase in parole denials to other-
wise release-ready applicants. In recent years, state and federal policy 
makers, historians, and political authors have acknowledged the harm 
done to our society by the War on Drugs, the Violent Offender Incarcer-
ation and Truth-in-Sentencing (“VOI/TIS”) Incentive Grant Program, and 
the reliance on incarceration as a means of addressing social problems.56 
This acknowledgement has translated into renewed interest in policy re-
forms on sentencing guidelines, alternatives to incarceration, and in-
creased emphasis on reentry support strategies.57 Yet, little interest has 
been expressed to equally address the influence that these same failed so-
cial policies had on increasing the percentage of parole denials. These 
social policies that ushered in the era of mass incarceration were instituted 
after the Greenholtz opinion became the established ruling of precedent. 
We must consider whether there would have been a different Supreme 
Court ruling in Greenholtz if the Court were aware of the ensuing changes 
in social policies that, without any constitutional protections, would di-
rectly affect people’s chances to be paroled. 
We must contextualize factors surrounding the Greenholtz ruling, in-
cluding that it survived by a five to four margin and that the majority’s 
opinion explicitly declared that parole was still the subject of experimen-
tation. The burning question becomes whether the Greenholtz ruling has 
outlived its shelf life. More importantly, can a new claim for constitu-
tional protections be entertained once a previous claim has been denied? 
According to the 2015 Supreme Court ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges, 
when “interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the court has recognized 
that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified ine-
quality within our most fundamental institutions that once passed unno-
ticed and unchallenged.”58 
Obergefell also offers an explanation as to why the Court should hear 
a new claim for constitutional protections after a previous claim had been 
denied. In Obergefell, the Supreme Court entertained a new claim of con-
stitutional rights to permit same-sex marriage which the Court had previ-
ously denied.59 In the Court’s decision to hear a new claim, the Court 
explained that “[i]f rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, 
 
 56 See Lichtenstein, supra note 22. 
 57 See, e.g., Alternatives to Incarceration (ATI) and Sentencing Reform, LEGAL ACTION 
CENTER, https://perma.cc/W5MC-A2P2 (last visited Apr. 9, 2019). 
 58 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015) (emphasis added). 
 59 Id. at 2605 (overruling Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)). 
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then received [discriminatory] practices could serve as their own contin-
ued justification and new groups could not invoke rights once denied.”60 
Here, the Supreme Court confirmed that in a society of evolving aware-
ness of structural or institutional abuses, any effort to present new claims 
of constitutional protections against such abuses cannot be turned down 
simply because the Supreme Court previously denied a similar claim. 
This theory, which allows new claims for constitutional protections 
to be heard and considered in the face of new societal insights, is one of 
the great beauties of the United States Constitution. 
The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of 
freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future 
generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy 
liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord 
between the Constitution’s central protections and a received le-
gal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.61 
Without this ability, the Supreme Court would be forced to uphold 
the disenfranchisement of women, racial segregation, and, for that matter, 
even the institution of slavery. Fortunately, this is not the case. Indeed, 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, which 
found racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional, offered in-
sight into the critical importance of taking changing societal circum-
stances into account when new claims for constitutional protections were 
made.62 In Brown, the Court acknowledged that “[w]e must consider pub-
lic education in the light of its full development and its present place in 
American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be deter-
mined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the 
equal protection of the laws.”63 
Although the issue in Brown was a matter that challenged racial seg-
regation in public education, from this passage we also can see that the 
Court did not merely observe the institutions of racial segregation and 
public education as isolated pillars. Thus, there is a common theme that 
the doctrine of stare decisis is not a locked door.64 This reminds us that 
 
 60 Id. at 2602 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 566-67 (2003)). 
 61 Id. at 2598. 
 62 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954). 
 63 Id. 
 64 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808, 828 (1991)) (“Stare decisis is not an inexorable command . . . .”). 
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“[t]he Constitution is ‘intended to preserve practical and substantial 
rights, not to maintain theories.’”65 
There must be substantial constitutional protections in parole deci-
sions. The structural abuses we see today were not presented to the Court 
in Greenholtz, and yet they have so prejudiced a class of otherwise parole 
eligible people that a new claim for constitutional rights to parole must be 
addressed. Illustrated here are three examples of structural abuses that 
have directly impacted the New York State parole system. 
A. Minimum Periods of Imprisonment (MPI) Abuses 
Until 1980, in addition to conducting parole board hearings, the 
Board of Parole shared the duty of setting Minimum Periods of Imprison-
ment (“MPI”) with sentencing courts.66 In other words, the sentencing 
courts and the Board of Parole were both responsible for determining 
when someone would be eligible for parole release consideration. How-
ever, in 1980, the N.Y. State Legislature amended Executive Law § 259-
i(1) to remove the shared responsibility of establishing MPIs from the 
Board of Parole and did away with the unnecessary duplication of func-
tions that the courts were better suited to handle at sentencing.67 
Columbia Law Professor Philip M. Genty explained the purpose of 
this amendment in the New York Law Journal: 
The purpose of this change was to eliminate unnecessary duplica-
tion of function between the Parole Board and the sentencing 
courts. Senator Christopher Mega’s memorandum in support of 
this change described the Parole Board’s power to set sentences 
as “an irrational waste of taxpayer[] money as well as criminal 
justice resources” and observed that “there is nothing on which 
the Board’s decision can be based which was not before the court 
at the time sentence was imposed . . . and most of these factors 
consist of matters the court is better able to ascertain and evaluate 
(e.g., seriousness of the offense, mitigating and aggravating fac-
tors, etc.).”68  
As a result, the Board of Parole’s responsibilities were regulated to 
making parole release determinations. However, despite the 1980 amend-
ments to Executive Law which stripped away the Board of Parole’s re-
sponsibility for setting MPI parole eligibility dates, the statute “stayed on 
 
 65 Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 514 (1942) (quoting 
Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904)). 
 66 Genty, supra note 7 (citation omitted). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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the books, and the guidelines remained unchanged” until they were offi-
cially appealed in 2011.69 Consequently, between 1980 and 2011, “the 
Parole Board often [performed] as if it were still responsible for sentenc-
ing decisions – it simply re-examine[d] the underlying crime and criminal 
history,” especially of people convicted of violent felonies, while neglect-
ing any meaningful assessment of rehabilitative maturity at the time of a 
person’s parole appearance.70 The Board of Parole’s abuse of people ap-
plying for parole could have been averted if parole applicants were enti-
tled to constitutional protections, because they would have had standing 
to appeal. 
B. Violent Offender Incarceration / Truth-in-Sentencing Policies, 
Resultant Mass Incarceration, and Greenholtz 
The 1994 Violent Offender Incarceration (“VOI”) and Truth-in-Sen-
tencing (“TIS”) Incentive Grant program officially marked the institu-
tional implementation of a social policy which made way for mass incar-
ceration. This policy also enabled the justification of Board of Parole 
abuses and the exploitation of people serving sentences for violent of-
fenses. 
The policy push for incarceration as a means of social control 
emerged during the right-wing campaign for the War on Drugs and 
greater “tough on crime” policies of the 1980s.71 This campaign gained 
momentum and materialized into the Violent Crime Control and Law En-
forcement Act of 1994, which established the Violent Offender Incarcer-
ation and Truth-in-Sentencing (“VOI/TIS”) Incentive Grant Program.72 
The VOI/TIS incentives appealed to states to adopt federal determi-
nate sentencing guidelines, which required that people who are incarcer-
ated serve eighty-five percent of their maximum sentence.73 The VOI/TIS 
grants also provided financial incentives for states to incarcerate people 
convicted of violent felonies sentenced to indeterminate sentences for 
longer periods.74 These incentives provided that a state would be eligible 
 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 For a comprehensive timeline on sentencing reform laws, see Arit John, A Timeline of 
the Rise and Fall of ‘Tough on Crime’ Drug Sentencing, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/A7ZC-U5RM. 
 72 Id.; OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS: 
VIOLENT OFFENDER INCARCERATION AND TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING INCENTIVE FORMULA GRANT 
PROGRAM 1 (2012), https://perma.cc/SW2Y-XZ67 [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE REPORT 
TO CONGRESS]. 
 73 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 72, at 3. 
 74 Id. at 1 (“The VOI/TIS Program provided formula grants to states to build or expand 
correctional facilities and jails to increase secure confinement space for violent offenders.”). 
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for additional funding when it demonstrated that, among other things, “it 
had increased . . . the average prison time actually served by Part 1 violent 
offenders; or . . . the average percentage of a sentence served by persons 
convicted of a Part 1 violent crime.”75 This aspect of the VOI/TIS incen-
tives was not intended to be applied retroactively. However, no protective 
measures were put in place to prevent unpredictable and inconsistent en-
forcement in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause.76 
Without clear constitutionally protected due process guarantees, be-
tween the 1990s and 2001, the New York State Board of Parole denied 
parole to individuals who were otherwise eligible for early release in or-
der to secure VOI/TIS funding. New York State Assemblyman Jeffrion 
L. Aubry and former Chairman of the Assembly Standing Committee on 
Correction noted: 
In the mid 1990’s [sic] fundamental fairness and truth in sentenc-
ing were hailed to be the hallmarks of democracy in sentencing 
justifying the enactment of determinate sentencing for most vio-
lent offenders . . . . It was unforeseen and not intended that these 
same hallmarks would be quietly subtracted from those who re-
main subject to indeterminate sentencing, which seems to have 
been the side effect in light of the 50% reduction in parole board 
releases for similar offenders since that time. Some might claim 
that it is a fair use of the board of parole to retrospectively 
lengthen the punitive phase of an indeterminate sentence imposed 
upon certain offenders; however, this is not the purpose of the 
board of parole nor should it be.77  
Truth-in-Sentencing incentives influenced the New York State 
Board of Parole’s decision-making authority to “retrospectively lengthen 
the punitive phase of an indeterminate sentence” by denying parole to 
otherwise worthy candidates for release.78 
 
 75 Id. at 2-3. 
 76 The void for vagueness doctrine is triggered when a statute or regulation “fails to pro-
vide even minimal guidelines to law enforcement, thereby allowing for unpredictable and in-
consistent enforcement and prosecution, which violates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Pro-
cess Clause.” People v. Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d 874, 883 (2012); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 
461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (“[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute 
define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand 
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discrimina-
tory enforcement.”). 
 77 Memorandum in Support of Legislation, Assemb. B. 7939, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011), 
https://perma.cc/DTY4-AC5Q. 
 78 See id. 
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New York State received $217,491,434 in VOI/TIS funding between 
1996 and 2001.79 According to the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s Report 
to Congress, New York ranked third in the nation, behind California and 
Florida, to receive the largest amount of VOI/TIS funding.80 New York 
primarily spent this funding on prison expansion projects.81 Ironically, 
this occurred during a marked decline in convictions that led to a de-
creased rate of prison growth.82 With less people coming into prison, the 
prisons had to increase the number of people incarcerated, and that re-
sulted in a sharp increase of parole denials for people who were convicted 
of violent crimes, from a forty-nine percent denial rate in 1994 to seventy 
percent in 1997.83 
The issue of capricious political influence on parole denial determi-
nation decisions, especially against individuals who committed violent 
crimes, was raised in Chan v. Travis in 2003. In this case, Chan argued 
that then Governor George Pataki had publicly expressed his commitment 
to prevent parole to anyone convicted of murder.84 After weighing the 
documented evidence presented by Chan, the Albany Supreme Court held 
that the Board of Parole’s reliance on the nature of the crime to deny Chan 
parole was the result of political influence and ordered the Board of Parole 
to provide Chan a new hearing.85 Subsequently, Chan was released and 
the Albany Court’s determination was rendered moot.86 With a blink of 
an eye, the issue of political influence on the Board of Parole was closed 
with Chan. This left thousands of others subjected to the Board of Parole’s 
de facto discretionary practices, which were highly incentivized with 
monetary compensation from the federal government. 
Governor Pataki remained in office for three terms and, thanks to his 
six Court of Appeals appointees, his “tough-on-crime” platform—which 
amounted to nothing more than an assurance to maintain a criminal justice 
status quo that had little to do with actual crime rates—long outlived his 
 
 79 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 72, at 21. 
 80 See id. at 5. 
 81 Id. at 21-22. New York’s prison expansion projects created an additional 4,950 beds. 
Id. at 21. 
 82 John Pfaff, Bill Clinton Is Wrong About His Crime Bill. So Are the Protesters He Lec-
tured., N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 12, 2016), https://perma.cc/8QD9-MTBT (“[New York’s] 
prison populations began a 15-year decline before the six-year program was even over.”). 
 83 Chan v. Travis, N.Y.L.J. 1202538922640 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cty. 2003) (“[I]t is not se-
riously disputed that since 1995 there has been a sharp decline in parole release for [people 
who have committed] violent felon[ies], from about fifty one percent in 1994 to thirty percent 
in 1997.”). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Chan v. Travis, 3 A.D.3d 820, 821 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (dismissing cross appeals 
because the Board’s decision to subsequently grant Chan parole rendered the appeals moot). 
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terms as governor.87 What the status quo did was to ensure that it would 
meet the eligibility for VOI/TIS federal funding and the grant’s “Carryo-
ver of appropriations,”88 which provided that obligated funds “shall re-
main available until expended. Funds obligated, but subsequently unspent 
and deobligated, may remain available . . . for any subsequent fiscal 
year.”89 This meant that once the state qualified for VOI/TIS awards, it 
was not bound to immediately use the funds for one particular purpose. 
This funding provided the perfect economic-stimulus package for the un-
deremployed and rural economy of upstate New York, because it left the 
playing field wide open for unrestricted governmental abuse. 
Governor Andrew Cuomo acknowledged this unrestricted abuse in 
his 2011 State of the State address, where he declared that “an incarcera-
tion program is not an employment program. If people need jobs, let’s get 
people jobs. Don’t put other people in prison to give some people 
jobs . . . . That’s not what this state is all about and that has to end this 
session.”90 
But, it has not ended.91 To roll back New York’s reliance on the 
prison system is to also undermine its dependency on the prison industry, 
health benefits, and pension plans for prison staff. Ultimately, the eco-
nomic security of the prison-industrial complex is a costly factor that can-
not be minimized. As Ernest Drucker has described: 
Currently, the prison industry supports one full-time employee for 
every one of the 2.3 million people behind bars. The scale of this 
enormous “prison-industrial complex,” encompass[as] over five 
thousand federal, state, and local prisons and jails . . . . With so 
 
 87 See Benjamin Pomerance, What “Tough on Crime” Looks Like: How George Pataki 
Transformed the New York State Court of Appeals, 78 ALB. L. REV. 187, 192 (2015); see also 
DON STEMEN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRISON PARADOX: MORE INCARCERATION WILL NOT 
MAKE US SAFER 1-2 (2017), https://perma.cc/5YWF-CR93 (“Overall, the increased use of in-
carceration through the 1990s accounted for between 6 and 25 percent of the total reduction 
in crime rates . . . . [H]igher incarceration rates are not associated with lower violent crime 
rates.”). 
 88 34 U.S.C. § 12108(b)(4) (2019). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, State of the State Address (Jan. 5, 2011) (transcript 
available at https://perma.cc/FW7D-55TN). 
 91 Due to a decline in new commitments to the New York state prison population, Gov-
ernor Cuomo closed seven New York correctional facilities in 2011, including Arthur Kill, 
Fulton, Mid-Orange, Oneida, Buffalo Work Release, Camp Georgetown and Summit Shock. 
However, the practices of the Board of Parole remained unbridled. Press Release, Governor 
Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Announces Closure of Seven State Prison Facilities 
(June 30, 2011), https://perma.cc/2TWR-UHXP. 
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many vested interests in maintaining the prison-industrial com-
plex, it is no wonder the system has become self-perpetuating.92  
Drucker’s description of the relative nature of the prison-industrial 
complex and its inextricable connection to VOI/TIS funding gives depth 
to understanding how mass incarceration has exploded with little to no 
relation to crime and punishment. 
C. 2011 Amendments - Where New Changes Produce the Same 
Outcome 
On April 1, 2011, the Division of Parole and the Department of Cor-
rectional Services merged to form the Department of Corrections and 
Community Supervision.93 The merger contained significant legislation 
amending both Executive Law and Correctional Law (“2011 Amend-
ments”), and directing the Board of Parole to: 
Establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions 
as required by law. Such written procedures shall incorporate risk 
and needs principles to measure the rehabilitation of persons ap-
pearing before the board, the likelihood of success of such persons 
upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in 
determining which inmates may be released to parole supervi-
sion.94 
In October of 2011, then New York Chairwoman of the Board of 
Parole Andrea W. Evans promulgated instructions to the Board of Parole 
Commissioners regarding the new legislation.95 Here, a section of instruc-
tions to commissioners illustrated the Board of Parole’s flippant attitude 
toward implementing the new amendments: “This instrument [TAP] 
which incorporates risk and needs principles, will provide a meaningful 
measure of an inmate’s rehabilitation . . . . Please know that the standard 
for assessing the appropriateness for release, as well as the statutory cri-
teria you must consider has not changed through the aforementioned leg-
islation.”96 
 
 92 Drucker, supra note 8, at 45, 47. 
 93 Merger of Department of Correctional Services and Division of Parole, DEP’T OF 
CORR. & CMTY. SUPERVISION (Apr. 2011), https://perma.cc/A84V-2KWC. 
 94 Ch. 62, § 259-c(4), 2011 N.Y. Laws 73. 
 95 Letter from Andrea W. Evans, Chairwoman of the Board of Parole, to Members of the 
Board of Parole (Oct. 5, 2011), https://perma.cc/9K6Q-6ZJ7. 
 96 Id. 
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This statement reflected the Board’s lack of commitment to mean-
ingfully reforming the parole process.97 Two years after the merger, the 
Board of Parole still had not filed its new regulations with the Secretary 
of State as required by the 2011 amendments. As such, the Board of Pa-
role was conducting parole hearings in violation of the law. As one Co-
lumbia County, New York Supreme Court judge wrote, since “no written 
procedures have been promulgated concerning how parole decisions 
should be made, the legislative mandate has been ignored.”98 
However, a later Albany County Supreme Court decision appeared 
to defend the Board of Parole.99 The Albany Supreme Court ruled that 
“there is no indication that the change in the statute required respondent 
to adopt a fixed guideline or policy which will determine the outcome of 
cases before the Parole Board.”100 However, by the end of 2013, Chair-
woman Evans was removed from her position and on December 18, 2013, 
the Board of Parole filed the Evans’ Memorandum with the Secretary of 
State to meet the statutory rulemaking requirement.101 
 
 97 The 2011 amendments were surrounded by general uncertainty about “why the statute 
was changed and what the revision was supposed to achieve,” and because the amendments 
were passed through an executive budget bill rather than an independent legislative initiative, 
there was no “memo from a sponsoring lawmaker, no approval message from the governor” 
documenting the legislative intent behind amending the parole process. John Caher, Effect of 
Risk Assessment Rule on Parole Decisions is Unclear, N.Y.L.J. (Apr. 30, 2012, 12:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/4L5J-8NKY. 
 98 Morris v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 40 Misc. 3d 226, 232 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2013). In Morris, the court held that parole denials were unlawful because the parole 
board was required to issue written regulations, and it did not, thereby violating the legislative 
mandate. Id. The Appellate Division has held, however, that formal rule-making was not re-
quired and that parole denials were lawful. Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2014). For additional information regarding the circumstances, see John Caher, No 
Obligation Found in New Law to Revamp Parole Procedures, N.Y.L.J. (Mar. 14, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/96G6-XLDR. 
 99 Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc. 3d 896, 905-06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013). The court declined to 
follow the rationale set forth in Morris that a failure to file written procedures with the Secre-
tary of State renders a parole decision in violation of lawful procedure. Id. The court held that 
the amendment to Executive Law § 259-c(4) cannot be considered a rule required to be filed 
with the Secretary of State, because the amendment did not require the Board of Parole to 
adopt a fixed guideline or policy which would determine the outcome of cases without regard 
to other facts and circumstances relevant to the underlying regulatory scheme. Id. While the 
amendment requires the Board to consider “future focused risk assessment analysis” rather 
than “past focused rhetoric,” the underlying regulatory scheme still requires case by case anal-
ysis and is dependent on the Board’s “independent exercise of their professional judgment.” 
Id. at 901, 907-08. 
 100 Id. at 905-06. 
 101 Parole Board Decision-Making, 35 N.Y. State Reg. 51, CCS-51-13-00013-P (proposed 
Dec. 18, 2013), https://perma.cc/C99E-5X32. 
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In the aftermath, Assemblymen Daniel O’Donnell and Kenneth P. 
Zebrowski articulated strong disapproval of the Board of Parole’s pro-
posed rules. The assemblymen stated: 
We were extremely disappointed to see that the proposed rules 
contain no substantive change to the working requirements of the 
Parole Board. Indeed, they fail to achieve any change in the status 
quo, much less the significant change envisioned at the time we 
negotiated the amendments. . . . The amended statutes of 2011 do 
not authorize or suggest additional factors but instead require a 
change of procedure and a change of perspective on the part of 
the Board.102 
Despite the robust debate and this emphatic explanation of legisla-
tive intent, it was not until September 28, 2016, under the leadership of 
Chairwoman Tina M. Stanford, that the Board of Parole published their 
proposed rules.103 Although this amended version closely aligned itself 
with the criteria set forth in expressed legislative intent, it took five years 
and new leadership for the Board of Parole to finally adhere to the legis-
lative mandates of Executive Law § 259-c(4). Activists predicted that the 
Board of Parole would be reluctant to use a new risk and needs instrument 
to replace their own methods.104 
In their study of the Oklahoma Probation and Parole System, crimi-
nologists Anne L. Schneider, Laurie H. Ervin, and Zoann Snyder-Joy ob-
served: “The presumed effectiveness of these instruments in increasing 
uniformity, effectiveness, or efficiency, may be undermined by imple-
mentation problems, including reluctance of professionals to permit quan-
titative systems to replace their professional judgments.”105 In other 
words, experts predicted that parole board members would be reluctant to 
implement regulations that would replace their professional judgment, 
and, for five years, the highest courts in New York State failed to enforce 
 
 102 Letter from Daniel O’Donnell, Chairperson, N.Y. Assemb. Standing Comm. on Corr. 
& Kenneth P. Zebrowski, Assemb. Chair, Admin. Regulations Review Comm’n, to Terrence 
X. Tracy, Counsel, N.Y. State Bd. of Parole (Jan. 21, 2014), https://perma.cc/R8JB-JQG4. 
 103 COMM. ON CORR., N.Y. STATE ASSEMB., ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2016). The 2016 pro-
posed regulations placed “greater emphasis on evidence of rehabilitation and objective meas-
urements of future risk, and less on past acts,” in addition to abandoning the previously fol-
lowed guidelines that “focused exclusively on the nature of the underlying offense and 
criminal history.” Jeremy Benjamin, Newly Proposed Parole Regulations, N.Y. STATE BAR 
ASS’N (Oct. 21, 2016, 10:57 PM), https://perma.cc/E45X-X458. 
 104 See, e.g., Release Aging People in Prison (RAPP) Campaign, Public Comments to Pro-
posed Parole Regulations Submitted by the Release Aging People in Prison (RAPP) Campaign 
(Oct. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/6Y2B-MTY2. 
 105 ANNE L. SCHNEIDER ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF QUANTITATIVE DECISION AIDS IN THE 
OKLAHOMA PROBATION AND PAROLE SYSTEM, AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THEM 4 (1990). 
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the proposed quantitative system, thus allowing this foreseeable predic-
tion to happen.106 
The effect of the 2011 amendments to the New York parole laws and 
the ensuing implementation problems demonstrate that “the very institu-
tion of parole is still in an experimental stage,” as articulated by the Court 
in Greenholtz. The Supreme Court’s notation of an experiment within its 
Greenholtz ruling must not be ignored. Indeed, the very nature of the ex-
perimentation process demands that the legislatures use the scientific 
method to assess the changes in circumstances and the recording of find-
ings in order to make evidence-based determinations. After nearly forty 
years of the parole experiment, now is the time to assess new findings in 
light of the many constitutional abuses against a defenseless class of peo-
ple. 
CONCLUSION 
On December 21, 2018, President Donald Trump signed into law the 
Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning 
Every Person Act (“FIRST STEP Act”).107 The bill will reduce mandatory 
minimum sentencing guidelines and provide incentives to people in 
prison to participate in evidence-based reentry/recidivism prevention pro-
grams in preparation for their release.108 However, the FIRST STEP Act 
is a bill that is only prescribed for the federal prison system, and it ex-
cludes individuals who have been convicted of a violent crime.109 This 
illustrates that people who have been convicted of a violent crime are not 
only disadvantaged at the state level, but are further excluded from federal 
protections. 
The policies which gave rise to the era of mass incarceration were 
not limited solely to the discriminatory arrest practices via the War on 
 
 106 See Linares v. Evans, 26 N.Y.3d 1012, 1013-14 (2015) (declining to consider Mr. Li-
nares’ arguments regarding the validity of the new regulations addressing risks and needs as-
sessments, and finding that the Board should have the first opportunity to evaluate the validity 
and application of the new regulations); see also Lewin & Carroll, supra note 9, at 275-79 
(discussing the litigation surrounding the 2011 amendments, including Mr. Linares’ case, and 
the subsequent regulations). 
 107 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 18, 21, 34, 42, 434 U.S.C.). 
 108 German Lopez, The First Step Act, Explained, VOX (Feb. 5, 2019, 9:42 PM), 
https://perma.cc/6UYH-Y63Q (“The law allows inmates to get ‘earned time credits’ by par-
ticipating in more vocational and rehabilitative programs. Those credits will allow them to be 
released early to halfway houses or home confinement. Not only could this mitigate prison 
overcrowding, but the hope is that the education programs will reduce the likelihood that an 
inmate will commit another crime once released and, as a result, reduce both crime and incar-
ceration in the long term.”). 
 109 See id. 
58 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:2 
Drugs and mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines. De facto parole 
policies and subsequent increased rates of parole denials of people who 
were convicted of a violent crime, and who are otherwise eligible for pa-
role, also have contributed to the backlog of people in prison. As indicated 
in the introduction, “parole denials do not appear to correlate with the 
issue of public safety. Parole denials are part of a much larger system of 
mass incarceration that has evolved over the past decades.”110 The late 
Mujahid Farid, Lead Organizer of the Release Aging People in Prison 
(“RAPP”) Campaign, also wrote: 
The crisis within parole and other prison release mechanisms in 
New York State has been mounting for the past 25 years. Back in 
the early 1990s, these systems became co-opted by an encroach-
ing punishment paradigm spreading across the United States . . . . 
Consequently, a process commenced of routinely denying parole 
and release applications . . . . This was especially the case with 
those who had been convicted of serious or violent offenses. 
Accordingly, this failure on the back-end release valve of the 
criminal justice system arguably played a major role in ushering 
in mass incarceration.111 
Unfortunately, attempts to prevent ongoing systemic abuse in parole 
by making a claim for constitutional protection have been impeded by the 
precedent of Greenholtz.112 However, the Greenholtz ruling determined 
that “the very institution of parole is still in an experimental stage” in 
which “few certainties exist.”113 There is reason to believe that this land-
mark case was never intended to be a permanent fixture. In other words, 
simply because a constitutional claim has been denied before does not 
mean that all future claims must also be denied. 
The Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges echoed its rationale in 
Brown v. Board of Education, directing that when “interpreting the Equal 
 
 110 Boudin, supra note 25, at 565. 
 111 RELEASE AGING PEOPLE IN PRISON (RAPP), A BY-PRODUCT OF MASS INCARCERATION: 
NEW YORK’S PAROLE SYSTEM IN NEED OF REPAIR 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/2WEP-PRPN. 
 112 See, e.g., Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (“Greenholtz 
therefore compels the conclusion that an inmate has ‘no constitutional or inherent right’ to 
commutation of his sentence.”); Artway v. Pallone, 672 F.2d 1168, 1179 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)) (“A sex offender 
such as plaintiff has no right to parole . . . prior to the expiration of the 20-year maximum term 
specified for the crime of sodomy.”); Kohler v. Armstrong, No. 93-17003, 1994 WL 259755, 
at *2 (9th Cir. June 14, 1994) (holding that plaintiff had no protected liberty interest in parole); 
Pruitt v. Heimgartner, No. 15–3118, 620 Fed.Appx. 653, 661 (10th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015) (citing 
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7) (denying petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of his liberty in-
terest in being considered for parole without due process). 
 113 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added). 
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Protection Clause . . . new insights and societal understandings” can give 
rise to constitutional protections of a class of people that was not previ-
ously existent. In the contextual backdrop of today’s parole in New York, 
failed social policies have led to the era of mass incarceration that did not 
exist forty years ago when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Greenholtz. 
Yet, Board of Parole abuses have so prejudiced people who have been 
convicted of a violent offense that it underscores the need for constitu-
tional protections in parole. Parole eligible people convicted of violent 
crimes have been and continue to be disadvantaged in the parole consid-
eration process, and Greenholtz must be reconsidered and reevaluated in 
light of today’s knowledge. 
